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Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4384
Low and highly volatile growth define Africa’s growth 
experience. But there is no evidence that growth volatility 
is associated to long term economic performance. This 
result may be misleading if it suggests that volatility is not 
important for economic and social progress. In this paper 
we use a variant of the method developed by Hausmann, 
Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) to identify both growth 
acceleration and deceleration episodes in Africa between 
1975 and 2005. The authors find that Africa has had 
numerous growth acceleration episodes in the last 30 
years, but also nearly a comparable number of growth 
This paper—a product of the Office of the Chief Economist , Africa Region—is part of a larger effort in the department 
to investigate growth and poverty in Africa. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The author may be contacted a tjarbache@worldbank.org. 
collapses, offsetting most of the benefits of growth. Had 
Africa avoided its growth collapses, it would have grown 
1.7 percent a year instead of 0.7 percent, and its GDP 
per capita would have been more than 30 percent higher 
in 2005.  The authors also find that growth accelerations 
and decelerations have an asymmetric impact on human 
development outcomes.  Finally, our results suggest 
that it is easier to identify the likely institutional and 
policy origins of growth decelerations than of growth 
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  During the last three decades growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa) has 
been both low and highly variable (Ndulu et al., 2007).  Between 1975 and 2005 per capita 
income PPP grew by 0.7% per year, by far the lowest figure among developing regions.  At 
the same time country growth rates were highly volatile.  Interestingly, however, there is no 
evidence that growth volatility was associated with Africa’s poor long term economic 
performance (Arbache and Page, 2007a).  This result is unexpected (Ramey and Ramey, 
1995, Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2004) and may be misleading.  Perhaps because no statistical 
association exists between Africa’s long term growth rate and its volatility, most attempts to 
explain Africa’s growth performance have focused on investigating the determinants of 
growth overtime and across countries using standard models and techniques (Ndulu et al., 
2007, O’Connell and Ndulu, 2000, Collier and Gunning, 1999).  Instead, given Africa’s high 
growth volatity, it may be more relevant and rewarding to examine the causes and 
consequences of medium term deviations from the long run trend – growth accelerations and 
decelerations. 
Building on the work by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005) (hereafter HPR), we 
propose in this paper an empirical method to identify growth accelerations and decelerations 
relative to a country’s long term growth trend.  Focusing on both good times and bad times 
gives us a broader view of the growth experience, which we believe to be particularly 
relevant for Africa. To reflect the heterogeneity of African countries’ long run performance, 
we endogenize economic conditions into the methodology by defining episodes of growth 
and decline relative to each country’s long run trend growth.  In contrast, HPR and related 
literature impose common parameters across countries to identify growth accelerations. 
Using our methodology, we find that African countries have experienced numerous 
growth acceleration episodes in the last 30 years, but also a comparable number of growth 
collapses.  In short, Africa’s long run record of slow and volatile growth reflects a pattern of 
alternating, identifiable accelerations and declines, rather than random variations of growth 
rates around the long run trend.  We also find that growth volatility – when viewed as the 
product of accelerations and declines – is not neutral and indeed matters for economic and 
social outcomes.  To begin to address the public policy questions posed by these results, we 
  2look for correlates associated with acceleration and deceleration episodes and examine the 
probability that an economy will undergo a growth acceleration or deceleration.   
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly discusses the Africa’s growth 
experience.  Section 3 presents the methodology for identifying growth accelerations and 
decelerations.  Section 4 presents the main results.  Section 5 examines whether growth 
accelerations and decelerations matter for economic and social outcomes and looks at 
correlates of accelerations and decelerations.  Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Africa’s growth 1975-2005 
Data on GDP per capita (PPP at 2000 international prices) and its growth rate are 
taken from the World Development Indicators, unless otherwise specified. Our sample 
includes all Sub-Saharan countries, except Liberia and Somalia, for which there are no GDP 
per capita PPP data.
1  Because we are primarily interested in examining the representative 
country, we use unweighted country data in the aggregate analysis unless otherwise stated.   
Our time series spans from 1975 to 2005.
2  We thus have an unbalanced panel of data 
with T=31 and N=45.  This period follows the first oil-shock and includes the commodities 
prices plunge, when many African economies collapsed and several conflicts erupted, the 
introduction of structural reforms, which brought significant changes in many economies, 
and the recently observed growth recovery.   
Figure 1 shows that mean GDP per capita in Africa had a slow, positive long term 
trend, consisting of about 20 years of virtual stagnation with a point of inflexion upwards in 
mid-1990s.  Since then, actual income has remained above the trend most of the time and the 
variance appears to have declined.
3 Figure 2 shows Africa’s growth path over the same 
period.  Trend growth declined until the late 1980s, and increased thereafter, although there 
is evidence of a slowdown in the last years.  Variance has declined since the mid-1990s and 
actual growth has tended to be above and closer to the trend. 
                                                 
1 Our sample accounts for more than 98% of population and 99% of the regional GDP in 2005. 
2 The WDI’s GDP per capita PPP series starts in 1975. 
3 We employ the Hodrick-Prescott filter in Figures 1 and 2 to smooth the estimate of the long term trend 
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Figure 2: GDP per capita growth
 
At the aggregate level, growth increased substantially during 1995-2005 and was 
accompanied by a sharp reduction in the coefficient of variation.  The per capita growth rate 
rose to 1.88% in this period from -0.23% of the previous decade, and the coefficient of 
variation fell to 3.2% from -25.5%.  This shift implies an increase of 2% in growth, which is 
about three-times the long term growth rate of 0.7%.  Income per capita went up to $2,486 in 
1995-2005, which represents an increase of about $300, or 11%, as compared to previous 
periods.  Recursive residual estimations, Chow breakpoint tests, and Chow forecast tests, do 
not reject the hypothesis that a structural break in the growth series occurred between 1995 
and 1997 (Arbache and Page, 2007b).  
  4 
3.  Identifying good times and bad 
We define a growth acceleration as a period that satisfies the following four 
conditions: 
Condition 1 – The forward four-year moving average growth minus the 
backward four-year moving average growth > 0 for a given year; i.e., the 
forward moving average window (t, t+1, t+2, t+3) must be higher than the 
backward window (t, t-1, t-2, t-3) and above 0. A signal change from (+) to 
(–) or vice-versa suggests growth trend shift;
4
Condition 2 – The forward four-year moving average growth exceeds the 
country’s average growth, meaning that the pace of growth during 
acceleration is higher than the country’s trend; 
Condition 3 – The forward four-year moving average GDP per capita 
exceeds the backward four-year moving average; 
Condition 4 – A growth acceleration episode requires at least three years in 
a row satisfying conditions 1-3.  An episode includes the three subsequent 
years after the last year that satisfies conditions 1-3; i.e., we attach the 
moving average window to the years identifying the growth acceleration.
5
Condition 2 endogenizes the country’s economic conditions, because its growth trend 
is a key parameter for identifying growth acceleration episodes.  There is clearly a risk that 
by identifying a period of modest, sustained growth in a low growth economy as a growth 
acceleration episode we will assign too much significance to a minor change in economic 
performance.  But it is also true that a period of relatively modest per capita growth, say 2%, 
may well be a genuine growth boom in a country enduring very low growth rates, and a 
decline in per capita income of equal magnitude could spell a serious economic collapse in a 
stagnant economy.   
Condition 2 also helps to limit the number of identified accelerations in countries 
with sustained, long run growth: if a country, for example, is growing rapidly it will lift the 
growth trend, reducing the number of estimated accelerations.  This is particularly significant 
for countries experiencing very low or very high growth rates.  Condition 3 ensures that the 
growth acceleration episode is not a recovery from a recession. 
                                                 
4 The window size may change according to the long term growth volatility of a set of countries and/or region: 
the higher the volatility, the lower should be the window size if one wants to observe the effects of volatility on 
economic performance. 
5 As an example, if conditions 1 to 3 identify growth acceleration during, say, 1991 to 1995, the years 1996, 
1997 and 1998 are included as part of the episode. Thus, this growth acceleration episode comprises a period 
that starts in 1991 and ends in 1998. 
  5The identification of growth deceleration episodes requires the following 
adjustments: in Condition 1, the forward four-year moving average growth minus the 
backward four-year moving average growth < 0 for a given year; in Condition 2, the forward 
four-year moving average growth is below the country’s average growth; in Condition 3, the 
forward four-year moving average GDP per capita is below the backward four-year moving 
average. 
The methodology has three main characteristics that affect the interpretation of the 
results: first, it identifies good and bad times rather than only focusing on rapid growth spells 
or deep collapses; second, it carries over inertia when identifying growth accelerations and 
decelerations; and third, it is sensitive to the length of time series. 
Figures 3-5 illustrate the methodology at work.  Condition 1 alone would identify 
1993-2005 in Tanzania as a growth acceleration episode (Figure 3).  But only the period 
1998-2005 satisfies Conditions 1-4 and is identified as a growth acceleration.  Condition 3 
identifies 1993-1998 is a recovery from a recession.   
Figure 3 : Tanzania - GDP per capita growth rate and growth acceleration
Only condition 1 
satisfied
(1993-05)



















































































The cases of Senegal and South Africa illustrate the method further. The dotted lines 
show deceleration periods, while the shaded lines identify acceleration periods. Senegal 
experienced a contraction between 1988 and 1994; the average growth rate during this period 
  6was -1.4%, well below the average of 0.35% (Figure 4). In contrast, average growth in 1994-
2001 – a growth acceleration – was 1.75%. 













































































In the case of South Africa, the average growth rates during the downturns 1982-1987 
and 1989-1994 were -1.91% and -1.54%, respectively, compared to the overall mean of 
0.12% (Figure 5). During the growth acceleration period, 1999-2005, growth was 1.96%. 
  Table A1 in the Appendix shows the start years of growth acceleration and 
deceleration episodes and compares our results with those from two closely related studies. 
HPR in their seminal work identify growth accelerations worldwide using GDP per capita 
growth from 1950 to 1999 from the Penn World Tables.  They compare seven-year forward 
and backward moving average growth windows and impose a cutoff that the forward moving 
average window should exceed the backward moving average window by at least 2%. They 
further require that average growth must be at least 3.5% during the acceleration episode.  
 





















































































  Pattillo, Gupta, and Carey (2005) (hereafter PGC) have applied a similar 
methodology to Africa only, using GDP per capita PPP growth between 1980 and 2004 from 
the IMF World Economic Outlook.
6  To address the higher volatility and lower overall rate 
of growth in Africa the authors use a five-year window and require that growth average be at 
least 2% during the acceleration.  
The main differences between these two methodologies and the one proposed here are 
that: first, the moving average windows are bigger than ours.  Second, they impose a cutoff 
of at least 2% in the forward minus backward moving average window, whereas we impose a 
cutoff of zero. Third, they impose a common minimum growth rate to define an acceleration 
for all countries, whereas we use the country’s growth trend as the cutoff.  In general, our 
calculations accord with those the other two studies, but since our filter is more flexible – and 
identifies decelerations – it picks up more episodes; we find 32% more episodes for Africa 
than PGC and 114% more than HPR. 
                                                 
6 PGC calculated the growth acceleration episodes using the HPR methodology and PPP growth data. So results 
in Table A1 are fairly comparable to ours, despite slight differences between the IMF and WDI data. The IMF’s 
and WDI’s data generally follow the same pattern. However, the WDI’s GDP per capita tends to be slightly 
lower than the IMF’s. For a discussion on the discrepancies between the IMF and WDI GDP data see Africa 
Development Indicators 2006 (p. 114). 
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4.  Results 
Table 1 shows the frequency of accelerations and decelerations and their associated 
growth rates during selected periods.  For the full period there is a slightly higher probability 
of a growth acceleration than deceleration: 25% of the 1,243 country-year observations (total 
of valid observations per country per year) belong to growth accelerations, while 22% are 
classified as growth decelerations.
7
Between 1975 and 2005 countries in Africa that experienced growth accelerations 
managed to grow on average by 3.6% during those episodes, compared with the region-wide 
average of 0.7%.  During decelerations countries contracted on average by -2.7%. Given the 
almost equal probabilities of growth accelerations and decelerations, most of the benefits of 
growth accelerations in the continent were offset by growth collapses, leading to the region’s 
overall tepid rate of growth.  Had Africa avoided its growth collapses it would have grown at 
1.7% a year in per capita terms instead of 0.7%.  Figure 6 shows the actual and simulated 
GDP per capita at these growth rates. Income per capita would have been at least 30% higher 
in 2005 from avoiding bad times.
8  Growth decelerations matter a great deal for fighting 
poverty in Africa 
The relative frequency of good and bad times is reflected in Africa’s long run pattern 
of growth.  Accelerations are more frequent in 1995-2005; decelerations are more common in 
the two preceding decades.  Forty two percent of the 494 country-year observations of 1995-
2005 occur in countries experiencing growth accelerations, and only 12% in countries 
undergoing growth decelerations.  The remaining 46% of observations belong to years in 
which countries were experiencing neither growth acceleration nor deceleration.  In 1975-
1984 growth decelerations were 350% more frequent than accelerations.
9 In 1985-1994 this 
ratio had dropped to 71%, mainly due to a sharp rise of accelerations to 21% from 4%. 
 
 
7 To check the robustness of our results we also identified growth accelerations and decelerations by replacing 0 
with +1% and -1% for acceleration and deceleration, respectively, in condition 1, but the results did not change 
substantially. We therefore report only the base case results because they are less restrictive. 
8 The simulated growth rate without collapses takes into account growth rate during all country-years but 
growth deceleration years. The additional GDP per capita results from the difference in compound growth at 
1.7% and 0.7% in 1975-2005. 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Actual GDP per capita
GDP per capita growth at the observed average (0.7% pa)
GDP per capita growth in the no-collapse scenario (1.7%pa)
 
 
In 1995-2005, the average growth rate for countries during acceleration episodes 
was 3.8%, the second highest average among the three ten year periods.  Interestingly, it 
was in 1975-1984, a period of very modest regional economic growth, that average 
growth during accelerations reached its highest rate.  This reflects a compositional effect 
at work.  In the last decade even long stagnant economies such as the Central African 
Republic, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania, experienced some 
sustained growth, pushing down the averages during acceleration episodes, whereas in 
1975-1984 the high average growth rate was mainly due to a small number of growth 
accelerations over all and very rapid growth in the Republic of Congo. 
The average (negative) growth rate for countries experiencing growth 
decelerations in 1995-2005 was less than half that in previous decades, contributing to the 
more positive overall economic performance of the period.  Economic declines had both 
the highest frequency – double that of the next highest decade – and the greatest impact 
on countries during the period 1985-1995. 
  Over the entire 30 year period richer countries have had more growth 
accelerations and poorer countries more growth collapses.  This is of course to some 
  11extent endogenous; average income per capita will tend to rise in countries with more 
frequent growth accelerations and fall in countries with more frequent collapses.  But this 
result also holds in each ten year period, where the compounding effects may be assumed 
to be less important.  This may indicate that richer countries are better able to take 
advantage of propitious circumstances and that poorer countries are less able to avoid bad 
times.  There is one interesting exception.  Income per capita for countries experiencing 
growth accelerations in 1995-2005 is slightly below the average for the region overall, 
indicating that growth successes have been spreading to poorer countries in the past 
decade. 
Table 2 shows the frequency of growth acceleration and deceleration episodes by 
country category and compares them with the mean.  In general, there is no substantial 
difference in the probabilities of growth acceleration and deceleration episodes for a 
given country category.  But, while geography does not appear to matter, geology and 
conflict do.
10  As might be expected, oil exporters and resource rich countries have more 
frequent growth accelerations, but somewhat unexpectedly, the same frequency of growth 
decelerations as the regional average.  Conflict is also important in determining good 
times and bad.  Major conflict countries had fewer growth accelerations than the regional 
average but also fewer decelerations.  They also had significantly lower average growth 
than the regional average. Taken together these results suggest that major conflict 
countries were trapped in a low level equilibrium.  Minor conflict countries have a 
substantially higher probability of a growth deceleration than the average and are much 










All countries' mean 0.25 - 0.22 -
Coastal 0.26 Above 0.22 Equal
Landlocked 0.23 Below 0.22 Equal
Coastal without resources 0.24 Below 0.23 Above
Landlocked without 
resources 0.22 Below 0.22 Equal
Oil exporters 0.29 Above 0.23 Above
Non-oil exporters 0.24 Below 0.22 Equal
Resource countries 0.30 Above 0.21 Below
Non-resource countries 0.23 Below 0.23 Above
Major conflict 0.16 Below 0.17 Below
Minor conflict 0.19 Below 0.32 Above
Table 2: Frequency of growth acceleration and deceleration by country category
Growth acceleration Growth deceleration
 
                                                 
10 See country assignment in Table A2 in Appendix. 
  12 
Table A3 in the Appendix shows the unconditional probabilities of growth 
acceleration and deceleration at the country level and the growth rates during these 
episodes.  The gaps between growth rates during accelerations and decelerations at the 
country level tend to be high, generating the high growth volatility observed in Africa.  
The high average growth rates observed in many economies during acceleration episodes 
also show the resilience and capacity of the region’s economies to grow when economic 
and political conditions favor growth.  The magnitude of economic contractions during 
deceleration episodes similarly indicates the severity of the consequences when economic 
and political conditions are unfavorable. 
There are 16 countries in our sample that have avoided growth decelerations 
altogether.  Many – Botswana, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Uganda – are among the region’s top performers in per capita income 
growth over the three decades, but not all.  Burkina Faso, Guinea, Namibia, São Tomé 
and Príncipe, and Swaziland are not among the region’s growth leaders.  Avoiding 
growth collapses is important for long run success at the country level, but is not the only 
factor contributing to robust long term growth. 
Seven countries – DRC, Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Madagascar, Mauritania 
and Niger – have never had a growth acceleration.  Of these only Eritrea shows good 
long term per capita income growth.  Four of the seven had long run declines in per 
capita income. 
5.  Do growth accelerations and decelerations matter? 
We have shown that growth accelerations and decelerations are an important 
feature of Africa’s low and volatile long run growth, but do they matter for economic and 
social outcomes beyond their direct consequences for the rate of growth?  If growth 
accelerations and decelerations have non-neutral impacts, one would expect that 
economic, social, and governance indicators will be different during such episodes than 
during normal times.  In this section we investigate the hypothesis of non-neutrality of 
growth volatility by examining differences in mean values in countries experiencing 
growth acceleration and deceleration episodes and simple correlations between changes 
in key economic and social variables and the presence or absence of growth 
  13  14
accelerations/decelerations.  Table 3 shows sample averages during growth accelerations, 
decelerations, and “normal” times. – defined as the absence of either.  Table 4 gives the 
correlation coefficients between a number of economic, social governance and 
institutional characteristics and the frequency of acceleration and deceleration episodes. 
Table 3 reveals an asymmetric relationship between growth accelerations and 
decelerations and some economic indicators.  The major changes in national accounts 
during growth episodes take place in investments and savings rather than in consumption.  
Savings and investments are higher during accelerations as compared with normal times, 
and substantially lower during deceleration episodes.  Foreign direct investment during 
accelerations is six-times the figure for deceleration episodes. 
Table 4 shows that countries that have high savings and investment have a higher 
probability of growth acceleration and less probability of deceleration.  Consumption is 
relatively lower during growth accelerations, which is consistent with the higher 
allocation of resources for investment.  But consumption is also lower during 
decelerations, which is probably due to the fall in purchasing power of households. 
With regard to the structure of the economy, the share of the agriculture sector is 
slightly higher in countries experiencing decelerations, while industry’s share is slightly 
larger in countries going through accelerations.  Correlations suggest that countries that 
rely more on agriculture have more spells of growth deceleration, possibly because of 
higher exposure to insects, draughts and other natural disasters, but also because of 
swings in agriculture commodity prices. 
Macroeconomic management appears to be an important factor in both good 
times and bad times.  Decelerations are accompanied by high inflation; one recent 
example is Zimbabwe.  There is a positive correlation between inflation and the 
frequency of growth decelerations.  Public debt is higher during both acceleration and 
deceleration episodes than during normal times, and government consumption falls 
during both accelerations and decelerations.  Correlations suggest that countries that 
increased their debt also experienced more growth accelerations and decelerations, which 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 The real effective exchange rate is more competitive during growth accelerations, 
and highly appreciated during decelerations.  Correlations suggest that exchange rate 
appreciation is associated with growth deceleration, whereas depreciation is associated 
with acceleration.  There is no evidence that current accounts change during growth 
acceleration and deceleration. 
Trade is substantially lower during decelerations.  Exports and especially imports 
drop sharply.  Correlations indicate that countries that trade less are more exposed to 
growth decelerations.  Somewhat surprisingly, the terms of trade are lower during growth 
accelerations.  This result may indicate that while high commodity prices trigger growth, 
they may not be the main factor behind medium term growth spells in Africa. 
ODA as percentage of GDP is similar in both good and normal times but falls 
during growth decelerations.  Per capita ODA, however, is higher during growth 
accelerations and lower during decelerations.  The correlation analysis suggests that a 
higher share of ODA in GDP is associated with fewer growth collapses, and that 
countries with higher ODA per capita experience more growth accelerations have, and 
fewer collapses.  These results indicate that ODA has been pro-cyclical, reinforcing 
arguments for greater predictability of ODA to underpin sustained growth. 
Growth variability also impacts a number of important human development 
indicators.  Life expectancy is substantially lower in countries experiencing growth 
decelerations than in normal times.  The correlation coefficient is negative, suggesting 
that more collapses are associated with lower life expectancy.  The dependency ratio is 
slightly lower during growth accelerations, and the correlation coefficient is negative as 
expected.  Under 5 mortality and infant mortality are substantially higher during growth 
decelerations than in normal times, but they do not improve during growth accelerations.  
Correlation coefficients suggest that and growth collapses are associated with increases in 
mortality.  The primary completion rate is substantially lower in countries experiencing 
growth decelerations and is negatively correlated with growth collapses. 
Policies and institutions are also closely associated with both good and – 
especially – bad times.  The World Bank’s CPIA score, a broad measure of policy and 
institutional performance, is lower during decelerations, but not significantly different 
  17between accelerations and normal times.  The correlation coefficients suggest that 
countries with lower CPIA scores tend to experience more economic collapses. 
All of the governance indicators – political stability, government effectiveness, 
rule of law, and control of corruption – are lower for growth decelerations than for the 
region as a whole.
11  Correlation coefficients are negative, suggesting that a deterioration 
of governance is accompanied by more frequent growth decelerations.  Voice and 
accountability scores are higher during growth accelerations.  The correlations also 
suggest that countries that experience more growth accelerations have more voice and 
accountability and better regulatory quality. 
Minor conflicts are more frequent during growth deceleration episodes than 
during normal times.  Major conflicts are less frequent during acceleration and 
deceleration episodes than for the region as a whole.  The correlation coefficients suggest 
that minor conflicts are associated with collapses, and that major conflicts hamper 
chances of a growth acceleration. 
These results reinforce the findings of other empirical studies (Ndulu et al., 2007, 
Dufrénot et al., 2006) of the close relationship between institutions and governance and 
economic performance in Africa.  However they also reveal that governance appears to 
be more relevant to understanding how to avoid a growth deceleration than how to 
promote an acceleration. 
Table 5 shows the conditional probabilities of a country experiencing a growth 
acceleration and deceleration at the aggregate level. Models 1-4 refer to growth 
accelerations and Models 5-12 to growth decelerations.  These regressions represent a 
further search for stylized facts about acceleration and deceleration episodes.  No 
causality is inferred from the relationships and no attempt has been made to control for 
endogeneity of some of the right hand side variables. 
Model 1 shows that a one percent change in investment is on average associated 
with a higher probability of a growth acceleration of about 0.1%.  So, an increase of, say 
10%, in investment is associated with an increase of 1% in the probability of a growth 
acceleration.  Voice and resource-endowment (Models 2 and 3) are also positively 
                                                 
11 Governance indicators are available for the following years: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2003, 2004, and 
2005. 
  18  19
                                                
associated with a growth acceleration.  However, all coefficients are significant at only 
the 10% level and the R
2 are low.  Model 4 shows a regression with all these correlates 
together. Only voice and resource-endowment remain significant at the 10% level.   
All estimated coefficients of Models 5-11 have the expected sign and are 
significant at the 5% level.  They show that more investment, higher ODA per capita, 
increased imports, and better governance indicators are associated with fewer growth 
decelerations.  Model 12 shows the coefficients for all of the non-governance indicators 
together. In this case, only investment remains significant.  The governance indicators 
were not regressed together because of their very high collinearity. 
Only investment is significantly associated with the conditional probability of 
both acceleration and deceleration episodes.  This suggests that it is likely to be an 
important factor for predicting spells of growth and collapse at the aggregate level, but 
we cannot assert with confidence that it is a leading indicator, due to its probable 
endogeneity.  Better governance indicators reduce the likelihood of growth decelerations, 
but they are not closely associated with more frequent accelerations.  
Table 6 shows fixed effect logistical models that predict the presence of a growth 
acceleration or deceleration at the country level.  Increases in savings, foreign direct 
investments, and consumption increase the odds of a growth acceleration, while 
government consumption and major conflicts reduce the odds.  In the deceleration 
regression, increases in savings, investment, foreign direct investment and trade reduce 
the odds of a growth deceleration, while inflation and minor conflicts increase the odds of 
collapse.
12 Only savings, foreign direct investment, and conflict appear in both 
regressions. These results suggest that policies aimed at attaining sustained growth and 
preventing growth collapses need to focus on ways to increase savings, attract foreign 
investments, and reduce conflicts.
 
 
12 We ran random effect models including dummies for oil-producer countries, and/or landlocked and/or 
resource-rich, but they returned statistically insignificant results. Hausman tests suggest fixed effect 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Variable Odds ratio p-value Odds ratio p-value
Savings 1.152 .000 .929 .000
Investment in fixed capital .956 .062
Foreign direct investments net flow 1.146 .000 .811 .000
GDP deflator 1.010 .016
Consumption 1.051 .004
Government consumption .904 .000
Trade .980 .008
Minor conflict 1.744 .045
Major conflict .435 .064
LR (chi2) 127.6 .000 97.4 .000
N 825 647
Note: fixed effect logit regression.
Table 6: Predicting growth acceleration and deceleration - panel data
Dep. variable: dummy of growth 
acceleration
Dep. variable: dummy of growth 
deceleration
 
Taken together our results suggest that growth decelerations are more predictable 
than growth accelerations.  In the African context it may be easier to understand what 
policy makers should avoid to prevent growth collapse rather than what they should do to 
achieve sustained growth.
13
6.  Conclusions 
This paper investigated growth acceleration and deceleration in Africa, seeking to 
uncover stylized facts and identify growth challenges not captured by standard long term 
growth analyses.  Contrary to the common wisdom, African countries have experienced 
numerous growth acceleration episodes in the last 30 years, but have also gone through a 
comparable number of growth collapses that cancelled out most benefits of growth.  We 
find that during growth accelerations the representative African country  managed to 
grow by 3.6%, while during decelerations it grew by -2.7%.  Ceteris paribus, had Africa 
avoided its growth decelerations, it would have grown in per capita terms at 1.7% a year 
instead of 0.7%, and GDP per capita would have been more than 30% higher in 2005. 
We find that it is easier to predict a growth deceleration than an acceleration.  One 
explanation is that there may be few commonalities among success stories.  Opportunities 
for growth vary with sound policies and good governance, but also with timing, initial 
conditions, inherited institutions, geography, availability of natural resources.   
Leadership, and other less observable factors may also have a role in achieving 
                                                 
13 HPR using a much larger set of countries also find that growth accelerations tend to be highly 
unpredictable, even after controlling for the standard determinants of growth, including political changes 
and economic reforms. 
  21sustainable growth.  Doing the wrong things – poor macroeconomic management, poor 
structural policies and institutions, and poor governance – appears to be a relatively 
broadly based predictor of a descent into bad times, heterogeneity among countries not 
withstanding. 
We find strong evidence that economic, social, governance, and institutional 
variables are significantly different during acceleration and deceleration episodes.  Thus, 
despite the apparent lack of a significant statistical relationship between growth volatility 
and the long run growth rate, volatility is indeed important for economic and social 
progress.   
We also find an important asymmetry between how growth accelerations and 
decelerations affect human development outcomes.  While growth accelerations result in 
relatively small improvements in human development, decelerations have important 
negative impacts on education and health outcomes.   These results suggest that 
preventing growth collapses is essential should Africa want to attain the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
Finally, we conclude that preventing growth collapses must be a central element 
of any long run growth and poverty reduction strategy for Africa.  Had Africa’s 
economies avoided growth decelerations the continent would have grown one percent 
faster in per capita terms over the past 30 years.  But policies to accelerate growth are 
also important.  Per capita growth of 1.7 percent per year – the simulated average if 
collapses could have been completely avoided – is still not sufficient to eradicate poverty 
in the medium term.  The keys to better long economic performance are both more 
growth and fewer collapses. 
  22 
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Angola 1993 1993 1984, 2000 1989
Benin 1993 1993 1985
Botswana 1986, 1996 1986, 1996 1985, 1996
Burkina 1994 1983, 1994 1993, 2000
Burundi 1983 1983 1991
Cameroon 1995 1986
Cape Verde 1992 1992 1992, 1996
Central African Rep. 1995 1985
Chad 1983, 1999 1983, 1999 2000 1990
Comoros 1999 1985
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1987
Congo, Rep. 1984 1984 1979 1984, 1990
Cote D'Ivoire 1993 1993 1994 1988, 1999
Eq. Guinea 1994 1994 1993
Erithrea
Ethiopia 1992 1992 1993 1988
Gabon 1986 1984, 1997
Gambia, The 1995 1991
Ghana 1983 1993, 2000 1979
Guinea 1994 1993
Guinea Bissau 1986 1996
Kenya 1984 1985 1990, 1997
Lesotho 1986 1986 1986
Madagascar 1979, 1988
Malawi 1994 1994 1992 1979, 1984
Mali 1994 1979
Mauritania
Mauritius 1984 1984 1984
Mozambique 1986, 1994 1986, 1994 1994
Namibia 1998
Niger 1980, 1989
Nigeria 1986, 1997 1979
Rwanda 1996 1996 2000 1991
Sao Tome and Principe 1997
Senegal 1994 1994 1988
Seychelles 1987 1987, 1995 1983, 1995
Sierra Leone 1999 1999 2000 1982, 1989
South Africa 1999 1982, 1989
Sudan 1995
Swaziland 1983
Tanzania 1999 1985, 1999 1998
Togo 1994 1980, 1988, 1998
Uganda 1986 1986 1992
Zambia 1999 1981, 1988
Zimbabwe 1986 1993 1998
Total number of episodes 21 34 45 40
Notes: 
The results using HRP parameters were calculated by PGC.
HPR and PGC did not investigate growth deceleration.
Table A1: Growth acceleration and deceleration start years
Acceleration
 






A n g o l a 111
B e n i n 010
B o t s w a n a 001
B u r k i n a  F a s o 000
Burundi 0 0 0
Cameroon 1 1 1
C a p e  V e r d e 010
Central African Republic 0 0 0
C h a d 101
C o m o r o s 010
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0 0 0
Congo, Rep. 1 1 1
Cote d'Ivoire 0 1 0
Equatorial Guinea 1 1 1
E r i t r e a 010
Ethiopia 0 0 0
G a b o n 111
G a m b i a ,  T h e 010
G h a n a 010
G u i n e a 011
Guinea-Bissau 0 1 0
K e n y a 010
L e s o t h o 000
M a d a g a s c a r 010
M a l a w i 000
M a l i 000
Table A2: Country categories assignment
Mauritania 0 1 0
Mauritius 0 1 0
Mozambique 0 1 0
N a m i b i a 011
N i g e r 000
N i g e r i a 111
R w a n d a 000
Sao Tome and Principe 0 1 1
S e n e g a l 010
Seychelles 0 1 0
Sierra Leone 0 1 1
S o u t h  A f r i c a 010
S u d a n 111
Swaziland 0 0 0
Tanzania 0 1 0
T o g o 010
U g a n d a 000
Z a m b i a 001
Z i m b a b w e 000  
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